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This paper looks at the two successive development paradigms that 
prevailed in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century, 
examining in particular the role assigned to the State in each. It will discuss 
how, in the ECLAC paradigm, a far-reaching role for the State as guide, 
sponsor and direct participant in productive development became less 
viable as the State was captured by private interests that no institution 
was solid enough to contain. Later, after the advent of the Washington 
consensus, the State became too severely weakened to carry out proper 
regulation of privatized activities or to sustain its long-term vision or its 
concern about income concentration. The paper touches upon the social 
demand for a new type of State and examines the requirements and 
objectives that will have to be met if the State is to facilitate the effective 
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At the kind invitation of my great friend and colleague 
José Luis Machinea, I took part not long ago in a very 
special meeting at the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The meeting was 
convened to honour the memory of Raúl Prebisch, 
an iconic Latin American economist and illustrious 
contemporary of many of those present. His memory 
evokes the golden age of development economics in 
the latter half of the twentieth century, a discipline he 
led with such wisdom in Latin America and brought 
to greater prominence in international academic 
circles and prestigious specialist institutions such as 
ECLAC, the Latin American and Caribbean Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). His life was rich in thought and action 
and in due course was instrumental in moulding new 
generations of professionals committed to the economic 
and social progress of Latin Americans, while his ideas 
are held in deservedly high regard by many prominent 
economists in the academic world today. For me his 
memory is genuinely moving, since he was both the 
teacher who opened my eyes to the workings of the 
real economy in Latin America and the world and a 
generous friend whose example, advice and support 
were a crucial influence on my career and my own 
dedication to the economic and social development of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. At the event, these 
feelings mingled with nostalgia for the years spent at 
ECLAC, which was and, I feel, still is my home ––the 
cradle of aspirations and experiences shared over so 
many years. I feel very grateful for the opportunity I 
was given to revisit the memories it holds for me and 
to find myself once again in the company of such good 
friends and travelling companions.
On that occasion, I shared a number of reflections 
on the role of the State over more than half a century 
of efforts to develop economic paradigms in the Latin 
America region. In this paper I will do the same. I do 
not intend to write a theoretical treatise, but rather to 
illustrate the vision of an exceptional practitioner in the 
work of academic disquisition and in the practicalities 
of the development policies followed by the great 
majority of the region’s countries.
 This paper is based on the lecture given by the author at the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 






The search for economic paradigms has been a constant 
in the region since the middle of the twentieth century. 
Few regions have known such fierce debate or such 
varied experimentation as Latin America. The region 
has been a veritable laboratory of ideas and policy 
proposals, each driven by the ideologies of the moment 
and often following teachings that originated elsewhere 
in the world.
A number of lessons can be drawn from this 
search. One thing I have learned in nearly half a century 
of experience is that economic underdevelopment is a 
much more complex matter than we believed it to be 
fifty years ago, for all the thought devoted to the subject 
at the time. In part, ECLAC was a seedbed of ideas 
brilliantly propounded by Raúl Prebisch. But it was also 
a centre for research and learning about the economic 
reality in each country, often in close cooperation 
with governments. The experience this provided gave 
us a better understanding of each country’s economic 
complexity and of its international environment.
Thus, one thing we were taught by the experience 
of so many years was to avoid the reductionism or 
oversimplification of reality that often accompanies the 
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search for paradigms. Simplification of this kind has 
been a feature of almost all theoretical formulations 
and the policy proposals following on from them. In 
my personal experience, oversimplification is found 
in two areas: in economic matters, and in relation to 
social and political frameworks.
How can we avoid the simplifications of theory? 
Advances in macroeconomic analysis have made an 
enormous contribution to policymaking. Macroeconomic 
models have made extraordinary progress in their 
capacity for policy analysis and prescription. Three areas 
in which particularly substantial and useful progress 
has been made are monetary and financial affairs, price 
formation (including inflation) and external trade.
Often, though, I feel that reality has been sacrificed 
to the formal and mathematical elegance of the models. 
Not that we should underestimate the contribution 
of macroeconomic models to knowledge and policy 
implementation, but there is sometimes a tendency 
to put formal elegance before the complexity of the 
economic, social and political reality.
Perhaps we can illustrate this by drawing a parallel 
with the building of a house. The input of a good 
engineer is needed to make sure the house has proper 
foundations and infrastructure. It will simply not be safe 
without them. But there is also the need for an architect 
who can supply a design that matches the aspirations and 
needs of its occupants. I think the search for economic 
paradigms is rather akin to this. Good economic 
engineers are needed to ensure the consistency of 
economic models and work out the optimum conditions 
for them. But economic architects are needed as well 
to see that the rationality of the economic engineering 
matches the requirements of the social and political 
reality. In my view, economic engineering has moved 
far ahead of the architecture of economic paradigms. 
The experience of years past has often revealed flaws 
in the design of  houses whose structure, by contrast, 
has been a model of formal elegance.
What has the experience been as regards socio-
political paradigms? Different ideas and categories 
of sociological and political analysis have been 
deployed in the effort to ascertain and grasp the true 
state of affairs, and this has brought us closer to a 
comprehensive understanding of reality. Inevitably, 
though, this appreciation of conditioning social and 
political factors has often fallen prey to non-empirical 
ideologies or constructs which, while useful in shedding 
light on social phenomena, risk putting ideology before 
reality. And this leads to socio-political simplification 
that is just as dangerous as the economic kind.
One of the most valuable lessons of recent years, 
then, is the need to avoid both types of simplification. 
In one case we risk ending up with economies but no 
society, and in the other with societies but no economy. 
All paradigms entail one risk or the other, so we must 
guard against oversimplification if we hope to develop 
an all-round appreciation of the reality in which we 
mean to implement relevant and viable economic and 
social policies.
None of this is to say that we should dismiss 
the role of ideas and ideologies. These have proven 
their value throughout history. What I have found in 
my personal experience, though, is that the search for 
economic and social paradigms needs to take account 
of national and international realities and identify 
the obstacles and conditionalities these create for the 
application of different policy proposals.
Institutions play a crucial role in shaping economic, 
political and social realities, as is increasingly being 
recognized. And one of the most important institutions 
is the State. In Latin America, the role of the State 
has been a key element in all major development 
paradigms.
 This issue is not new, but I propose to address it 
here because it may be interesting to examine it in the 
light of my personal experience, drawing in particular 
on the findings of our work over the last few years at 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), where 
we set up a special unit to analyse political problems 
in Latin American development, particularly the role 
of the State. In doing this, we were simply adding 
our efforts to the institutionalist thinking of recent 
years, with its stress on the fundamental role of 
institutions when it comes to explaining and combating 
development problems.
I should like to discuss the role of the State in each 
of the two main economic policy paradigms of the last 
50 years in Latin America: the ECLAC paradigm and 
the Washington consensus. Consideration of this and 
the lessons it yields shows the need to rethink the role 
of the State in the light of the new realities in Latin 
America and the economic strategies being applied in 
the region.
1. The ECLAC paradigm
For our generation, the first great encounter between 
State and paradigm in Latin America resulted from the 
ECLAC approach. As we know, the framework of that 
paradigm contained a set of key ideas that included: 
(i) the setting of the paradigm in the framework of the 
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centre-periphery relationship; (ii) inward development; 
(iii) the role of technology; (iv) import-substitution 
industrialization; and (v) an active role for the State. 
Implementation of this development strategy required 
a series of specific tariff, tax, currency and credit 
instruments and policies, along with fiscal incentives 
for industrial development and measures to deal with 
the explosion of social demands generated by migration 
from rural areas to cities.
In these circumstances, the State had a leading 
role to play and accordingly created line ministries, 
planning offices and development banks to mobilize 
financial resources and technology. Enlarging and 
strengthening the State apparatus was the central tool 
of economy policy. The development process driven by 
this strategy profoundly altered the economic and social 
profile of Latin America. One of the main aspects of 
the social transformation was intensive urbanization. 
As regards the economy, the manufacturing sector 
came to account for a larger proportion of total 
production and employment while agricultural output 
held steady or declined, the growth of public-sector 
services (and employment) accelerated, and government 
bureaucracies expanded in tandem with the share of 
total resources absorbed by the State. Urban incomes 
grew and outstripped rural incomes quite markedly, 
although this upward tendency weakened sharply from 
the 1960s to the 1970s.
What accounts for this progressive exhaustion 
of Latin American development? Were not the 
underlying development policy principles the same as 
those applied so successfully by the “Asian tigers”? 
So why did Latin America prove unable to operate a 
progressive industrial economy in a viable way, instead 
losing significant ground to countries that began their 
industrialization from a weaker base? The causes 
were many, but there were some factors that had a 
particularly harmful impact.
In Asia, the State had greater autonomy than 
in Latin America and could build on a tradition of 
bureaucratic efficiency and independence from the 
influence of private interests. The Latin American 
experience was very different, not so much in the nature 
of the policies as in the way these were implemented. 
The fiscal base was inadequate, mainly because there 
was no genuinely redistributive social and political 
covenant. The State was easily dominated by private 
interests, including those of political groupings or 
parties, business groups, military leaders, caudillos 
or dictators, who used the State to build up their own 
political and economic power. This also accounts for 
the clientelism of employment and public expenditure 
management by authoritarian or semi-democratic 
regimes.
In short, the kind of State that existed at the 
time of the ECLAC paradigm was omnipresent, 
centralist and captive. Moreover, few Latin American 
countries succeeded in making much progress with the 
construction of a solid democratic State, an essential 
condition for securing independence from private 
interests and confidence in the rule of law. Those flaws 
led ultimately to political instability and the democratic 
deficit.
The studies done at the IDB analysed this 
democratic deficit from the perspective of two different 
relationships: State-market and State-society. Gaps or 
flaws in those relationships made sustainable, equitable 
development a less viable proposition.
Thus usurped by private interests, the State 
intervened in ways that blocked the efficient operation 
of the market and encouraged rent-seeking, speculation 
and corruption. Again, public policies that had been 
captured by private interests could not respond to the 
demands of most citizens, and this played a part in 
excluding large sections of the population from the 
benefits of development and eroding the legitimacy 
of the State.
The exhaustion of the heterodox ECLAC model 
precipitated the crisis of the State. This is not the 
occasion to examine the reasons for this model’s 
exhaustion. Suffice to say that the crisis experienced by 
Latin America in the 1980s —which reached its nadir 
with the debt crisis— accelerated inflationary processes, 
accentuated the loss of economic competitiveness 
and widened social gulfs. On the institutional side, 
central banks, ministries of planning and financial 
and development institutions were destroyed. Just as 
serious, however, if not more so, was that the long-term 
approach to development policymaking was lost. In 
most Latin American countries, policymakers’ attention 
was monopolized by the problems of economic survival 
and short-term crises. This situation, and especially 
the problems arising from the debt crisis, prompted 
ECLAC to warn at the beginning of the 1980s that 
a “lost decade” was imminent for the continent. 
Unfortunately, this proved to be exactly the case, with 
deeply damaging consequences for the economies and 
societies of Latin America.
The severity of the crisis led to the abandonment 
of the heterodox model and to the return of the 
orthodox model and the adoption of the Washington 
consensus.
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2. The Washington consensus
The return of orthodoxy meant the adoption of 
market rules, use of the price system as the main 
mechanism for resource allocation, the implementation 
of stringent stabilization programmes, the liberalization 
of international trade, inflows of financial resources 
and private investment from abroad, and a far-reaching 
policy of privatization. Economic reforms were 
promoted largely by financial agencies in Washington, 
and particularly those that emerged from the Bretton 
Woods Conference, which were to be among the driving 
forces behind reform.
The conception of the liberal State enshrined in the 
Washington consensus was pervaded by an anti-statist 
attitude whose rationale derived from the crisis of the 
heterodox State, with its inefficiency, its unwieldy 
bureaucracy and, especially, its corruption.
Another definite influence was the generally 
expanding role of the market in a growing number of 
emerging economies, both in developing countries and 
in the socialist sphere.
The new conception was of a minimalist, hands-
off State. All sorts of reasons were found to disqualify 
the State from acting as a mechanism of resource 
allocation, the main ones being its ineff iciency, 
corruption, clientelism and bureaucratic excesses. 
Hence the advocacy of a minimized State, entailing 
the closure of institutions, the abolition of policy 
instruments and the pruning back of excessive 
interventionism. Industrial and agricultural policies, 
for example, were dispensed with. Most importantly, 
long-term vision was lost.
A serious mistake was thus made in implementing 
the reforms, that of turning away from the State. Because 
State involvement was rejected, the generality of reforms 
lacked credibility. According to Latinobarómetro 
surveys, only a third of Latin America’s people have 
faith in the reforms. The result has been that large 
majorities of the population have increasingly come 
to view reforms and the market as illegitimate. This 
crisis of credibility has compounded a widespread 
feeling of frustration and fatigue at the slow pace of 
progress and the severity of the sacrifices made to 
implement reforms.
So, how does the State relate to the market and 
citizens in this new paradigm?
Where the State-market relationship is concerned, 
economic policy has undergone major changes, 
including: (i) privatizations and the opening up of 
whole sectors of the economy to market forces; (ii) the 
weakening or absence of the regulatory frameworks 
needed to spur competition and protect consumers’ 
interests; (iii) the sustained opposition of corporate 
interests to reform processes; (iv) the lack of proper 
mechanisms for negotiation between the winners and 
losers from reform; (v) the abandonment of measures to 
promote specific production sectors; (vi) lack of progress 
on genuine fiscal reform; and (vii) low and decreasing 
public investment in infrastructure.
Concerning the State’s relations with citizens, a 
number of points need to be raised. The conditions 
for genuine justice and the rule of law are still absent 
in many countries. For one thing, judicial systems are 
unreliable, and this heightens the lack of legal security. 
Meanwhile, the State lacks the capacity to promote 
redistributive social covenants.
Moving on to the approach taken by the new 
development strategies to the role of the State, a general 
feature of the latter years of the twentieth century and 
the early years of the twenty-first has been a strongly 
renewed concern with social development. In one way 
or another, too, the whole world has felt the effects of 
the tragic events of 11 September 2001,  especially the 
emphasis on State-led security measures.
The State’s relationship with the market and 
citizens in this new paradigm has left the public 
administration poorly equipped to develop and 
implement policies, largely as a result of fiscal crises. 
Reforms to the public administration have yielded more 
in the way of fiscal reforms than of specific exercises in 
reorganization. They have tended to be technocratic in 
nature, neglecting to pursue real change in the structure 
of the State.
Hence, in recent years there has been a new 
interest in redefining the role of the State in the context 
of the new development strategies including, as noted 
earlier, a marked concern with social development and, 
since 2001, with national security measures. This has 
coincided with a propitious international economic 
environment, substantial growth in world output and 
trade, an upturn in commodity prices and an expansion 
in financial flows and foreign private investment. 
The benefits this international economic upsurge has 
brought to Latin America have been further enhanced 
by the sound macroeconomic management that is now 
the rule in most of the region’s countries, where both 
external debt management and export performance have 
benefited from favourable external conditions.
The new economic strategies are being applied in 
a general framework dominated, on the external side, by 
better balance-of-payments positions than in the past and 
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by the presence of new international actors such as China 
and India, which represent both great opportunities and 
major challenges for the region; and domestically, by the 
consolidation of sound macroeconomic management, a 
new focus on macroeconomic problems and a renewed 
acceptability both for specific public policies to correct 
market failures and for State action generally. All of 
these are issues that ECLAC has been working on since 
its foundation.
Might this be a new paradigm we are seeing? In all 
honesty, I think not; I prefer to construe it instead as an 
incremental paradigm. Latin America possesses a great 
deal of pragmatism, learned from its own and others’ 
experience, together with an increased awareness of 
the constraints imposed by international relations in 
the modern world. As State and market have drawn 
together, the general rule has been the one expressed by 
President Ricardo Lagos here in Santiago: more market 
and better State. Of course, it is up to each country to 
decide the best relationship between the two.
III        
A new conception of the State: its objectives
and the means to achieve them
The matter we need to consider, therefore, is the new 
conception of the State, drawing on the good and bad 
lessons learned from its role in the two preceding 
paradigms. I propose now to use those experiences 
to identify a number of objectives that I think are 
important in the effort to define this new State.
1. Objectives
A first objective is to have a State capable of making 
market efficiency a viable proposition. The State is 
important, if not indispensable, in achieving an efficient 
market, which requires a reliable and credible legal and 
judicial system to enforce property and personal rights. 
Another necessity is a regulatory framework that strikes 
the right balance between public and private interests. 
Competition also has to be fostered and protected in 
the interests of market efficiency. Experience has shown 
how bad the results of privatizing State enterprises can 
be when these conditions are absent, with a public 
monopoly simply being replaced by a private one. In 
short, an efficient market capable of providing growth 
and opportunities for the whole population requires a 
State that can act effectively where needed, refraining 
from intervention when this can do no good.
Second, the State needs to be able to stimulate 
production capacity. This is not to argue for a producer 
State as a matter of principle, although the option 
should not be ruled out. What is important in this 
conception of the State’s role is the implementation 
of public policies to build up production capacity 
in the sectors most critical to development, such as 
those associated with technological and productive 
innovation. We propose that the State should intervene 
intelligently, but without going against the market, and 
that the dogmatic exclusion of the State that was a 
feature of earlier years should be avoided.
Third, we need a State that can take responsibility 
for reducing social inequalities. The State plays a 
essential role in actively defending social cohesion and 
combating poverty. The efficiency of political and civil 
rights hinges on the existence of a State apparatus that 
can guarantee respect for legality and decent material 
living standards for the population by recognizing and 
protecting economic and social rights. This entails the 
State performing two basic functions: an enabling role 
and a compensatory one. The State enables citizens 
by providing access to greater equality of opportunity 
through education, while its compensatory role derives 
from its obligation to protect the welfare of the most 
vulnerable in society. This is not to say, however, 
that the State should have a leading role in economic 
growth as a way of solving the problems of poverty, 
since this would mean supplanting the private sector 
in its economic responsibilities.
Fourth, a prominent part of the modern experience 
is a new relationship between the State and private 
enterprise that has yielded substantial economic and 
social dividends. New forms of cooperation can be 
identified in this field, such as the joint financing of 
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infrastructure by the State and private enterprise, which 
will certainly represent one of the greatest challenges 
for the regional economy in the coming years.
Fifth, where the State’s role vis-à-vis civil society 
is concerned, it is clearly understood today that 
strengthening civil society goes hand in hand with 
State reform. At the IDB we have repeatedly stressed 
that there can be no effective State without a strong 
civil society, and vice-versa. That is, there cannot be 
a strong civil society without the support of a robust 
and efficient State. Strength must not be confused with 
size, however, or muscle with fat, as Prebisch often 
used to say. Development requires more State, more 
market and more civil society, but in a coherent fashion 
that allows all three to co-exist and bring out the best 
in each other. The relationship needs to be fostered 
creatively by building up mechanisms for civil society 
engagement in State functions. This is undoubtedly a 
great challenge, and the first step in addressing it is 
to do away with the mutual suspicions so often found 
in this relationship.
Sixth, the State has a key role to play in orienting 
and setting the policies that will determine the country’s 
international positioning. It is the State’s job, in 
consultation and collaboration with the private sector, 
to take the major decisions that go into shaping the 
country’s relationship with the outside world. This 
is crucially important at a time when international 
relations are becoming more and more complex, 
both regionally and globally. The role of the State 
is especially significant in the regional integration 
process. The kind of de facto solidarity on which 
economic and political integration is built depends 
on a progressive convergence of interests, values and 
cultures, whose backbone is the institutional capacity 
of the countries and, in particular, the role of the 
State. Integration is a complex, dynamic process that 
is advanced by resolving the conflicts that arise in 
adapting the economic, political and social structures 
of the different countries. It is difficult to see how 
this could be achieved without the leadership of State 
institutions. Jean Monet used to say that nothing was 
possible without people but nothing was lasting without 
institutions. Regional integration, which is itself a 
process of State reform, can hardly progress unless 
there are States capable of dealing effectively with the 
adaptation problems it entails.
Seventh, the State plays an absolutely crucial 
role in technological innovation. At the early stages of 
nation-building, the State played a fundamental role 
in educating citizens. Today, the new frontier that is 
opening up for the primary responsibility of the State 
is support for the development of technology and 
technological innovation. What education was yesterday, 
the expansion and quality of education are now. Today’s 
responsibilities also include the promotion of scientific 
research and technological innovation. This is not to 
deny the essential role of private-sector activity in this 
field, but the gap that separates us from the developed 
world may widen unless we make a massive effort of 
technological development, and this will inevitably 
require effective action on the part of the State.
Eighth, in our increasingly complex world we 
need to strengthen our capacity to analyse key trends 
in the economy, society and politics at the international 
level. We live in a world that is advancing at an 
unprecedented rate in every field, dominated by the 
forces of globalization and the astonishing development 
of information and communication technologies. 
Accordingly, one of our very highest priorities must be 
to maintain the maximum possible level of observation 
and monitoring capabilities. In this, the modern State 
needs to encourage ongoing discussion and analysis 
by the public and private sectors so that we can cope 
with the challenges and benefit from the opportunities 
created by different aspects of globalization.
Ninth, planning offices are a proven institutional 
tool for developing the capacity to analyse major 
national and international economic, social and political 
trends. It is time to make amends for our past failure to 
analyse and reflect on the future. Long-term thinking 
must again become an important objective for the 
contemporary State. We are not arguing for central 
planning, but for the ability to project long-term trends 
as a basis for development strategies.
Tenth, another vital function of the modern State 
is to build up broad national consensuses. We know 
that consensus-building at different levels between 
the State, private enterprise, trade unions and civil 
society has been a valuable experience for many 
developed countries. Without wishing to dilute the 
responsibilities of each sector of society, it is worth 
trying to create mechanisms to contribute to the broad 
national consensuses that appear to be so useful and 
necessary in the conditions prevailing in the region 
today. Creating and supporting economic and social 
councils would seem to be a task that merits particular 
attention from the State.
To supplement this veritable catalogue of objectives 
for the new State, we should try to identify or determine 
the requirements and instruments that are appropriate 
and necessary to achieve them.
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2. Requirements
In my view, the f irst requirement is a robust 
democratic system. This is certainly the most important 
precondition, although this assertion may be rather 
unexpected given that it is perhaps unusual to treat 
the capacities of the State as conditional upon the 
maintenance and advancement of democracy. It is, 
however, relatively common to associate the poor 
functioning of democracy with the development of 
its liberal component, relating this to the weakness of 
the mechanisms that protect civil and political rights 
and liberties by effectively limiting and apportioning 
power. Less attention has been paid, however, to the 
weakness resulting from deficiencies in what has been 
called the republican component of democracy, by 
virtue of which the exercise of public power should 
be a public-spirited activity involving strict obedience 
to the law and the public interest, often at the expense 
of private interests.
A second condition is the creation of a professional 
civil service with a solid institutional position and 
sense of duty, set within a suitable legal framework. In 
advanced democracies, the institutional independence 
of a civil service in which access and career progression 
are governed by strict criteria of equality, merit 
and ability acts as a counterweight to political and 
governmental freedom of action and as a check on 
arbitrary behaviour, safeguarding the values of legality 
without which the rights and liberties of citizens 
would be difficult to protect effectively. Democracy 
cannot be consolidated without State reform to 
institutionalize a professional civil service. The 
progress of political, economic and social democracy 
in developed countries cannot be understood without 
acknowledging the strength of their administrative 
institutions. It should come as no surprise, either, that 
the Latin American countries with the best indicators 
of social cohesion are those whose public institutions 
have the strongest traditions, including a career civil 
service. Consequently, there is a need to depoliticize 
the public administration and prevent its capture by 
private interests, leading to clientelism and cronyism. 
This is a vital step along the road to the kind of State 
that Latin American democracy needs today.
There is also a need to expand and improve public 
expenditure management capabilities. Sustainable and 
equitable growth depends on the quality and efficiency 
of public policies and management. It is therefore 
essential to increase the fiscal capacity of governments, 
together with their responsibility. A particular priority 
must be to adapt resource allocation systems to the 
needs of the poorest and to tailor systems of provision 
to their specific circumstances, providing them with 
opportunities for direct participation and engagement. 
To achieve all this, it is essential to depoliticize the 
public administration and prevent its capture by 
private interests, as already noted. It is the role of 
public administration to provide the basic institutional 
platform for the design and implementation of public 
policies that reflect the general interests of society.
Lastly, any approach to State reform will need to 
deal both with the ideological baggage associated with 
this and with the logic that reduces it to a mere set of 
technical problems. State reform can only be arrived 
at through incremental adjustments conceived on the 
basis of a political economy that is grounded in the 
achievable. Reality shows that ideas, not ideologies, 
are what gradually drive progress towards solving 
problems. This holds true for the design of the State: 
there are few viable options associated with flags of a 
particular colour, but there are opportunities for gradual 
and usually cross-cutting changes requiring broad 
consensus and support from society as a whole.
By the same token, to treat State reform as an 
exclusively technical problem  distinct from politics 
is to ignore a reality that reappears over time in 
unsuspected forms. It has become increasingly clear that 
the countries which have been able to make sustainable 
progress are not those which have subordinated political 
logic to purely technical criteria. Only when there is 
some kind of entente between technical and political 
rationality, when reforms have been presented and 
discussed openly and without fear of the political 
cost, when there has been cross-cutting investment 
in local knowledge and collective appropriation of 
plans and projects, do we see advances which, albeit 
slower, prove more sustainable and equitable. It is 
important to emphasize that, apart from some basic 
common ground in relation to macro balances, the most 
successful countries display a very diverse range of 
institutional and political reform models. But another 
common trait is that they have devised innovative ways 
of solving their problems, each striking a particular 
balance between political and technical rationality. This 
is perhaps the most important lesson from reform in 
such countries as Chile and Brazil.
(Original: Spanish)
